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NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE EXCESS,
Stanley Mosk *
Last year the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a forty-year
prison sentence, with no possibility of parole, was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The case-State v. Bartlett 2--involved a twenty-three-year-old man
who had sex with two girls, one fourteen years and ten months old, the
other fourteen and one-half years old. There was no question that the
sex was entirely consensual. The defendant had no prior felonies and no
instances of molesting young children. Nevertheless, the forty-year sen-
tence was mandatory under Arizona statutes. Citing "the realities of ad-
olescent life,"3 among other factors, the high court of Arizona found the
sentence unconstitutional.
Sentences like the foregoing suggest a newly devised theory: Noth-
ing succeeds like excess. California sentencing courts have been in the
forefront of pouring on the years, particularly where that ugly word
"sex" is involved. The Arizona forty-year sentence is modest by Califor-
nia standards.
In January of this year my colleagues denied a petition for habeas
corpus in a case in which the defendant was sentenced to 129 years in
prison.' And on the same day they denied a hearing for a defendant who
was sentenced to ninety-eight years.5 Last November they denied habeas
corpus after the court of appeal approved a sentence of ninety-nine years,
four months,6 and in January a 111-year sentence was approved.7
Even those sentences are commonplace. In 1990 the defendant in
People v. Lewis8 was sentenced to 155 years plus two consecutive life
terms running concurrently with two additional life terms. George
Anthony Sanchez, known as the "ski mask rapist," was given 406 years
* Justice, California Supreme Court.
1. Keynote address delivered by Justice Stanley Mosk at the Symposium on the
California Judiciary held at Loyola Law School on March 19, 1993.
2. 830 P.2d 823 (Ariz.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 511 (1992).
3. Id. at 829.
4. In re Bestelmeyer, No. S030174, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 354 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 1993).
5. People v. Carter, No. S029714, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 359 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 20, 1993).
6. In re Wheeler, No. S029714, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 6028 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1992).
7. Belton v. Superior Court, No. S030305, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 516 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 27, 1993).
8. No. S013891, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 1460 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 4, 1990).
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in prison for child molestation9 and Grace Dill received 405 years in
prison for child molestation.10 The prize, at least momentarily awarded,
goes to the Johnson and Cabarga defendants who were given terms of
537 and 208 years respectively in San Francisco Superior Court. What
judge will be the first to make the Guinness Book of World Records by
imposing a prison sentence of 1000 years?
Unquestionably, sex offenses are serious, and often have a long-term
residual effect on the victim. But it cannot be said that they are more
serious, in permanent effect, than murder in the second degree, providing
a sentence of fifteen years to life;11 mayhem, two, four or eight years in
prison;12 gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, four, six or ten
years;13 cruelty to a child likely to produce great bodily injury or death,
two, four or six years;14 cruel or inhuman corporal punishment on a
child, two, four or six years;15 acts of terrorism, three, five or seven
years;16 placing a child in a house of prostitution, only a misdemeanor. 7
Unfortunately there appears to be an emotional aspect to sex of-
fenses, whether committed on an adult or a juvenile, producing an effect
on the sentencing process. All too often an irate sentencing judge re-
sponds to a defendant's egregious conduct by imposing a sentence of
monstrous magnitude. The judge imposing such a sentence may believe
he is dramatically demonstrating society's contempt for the defendant-
and incidentally the judge is likely to obtain substantial media cover-
age-but in actuality such a result reflects on the objectivity and dispas-
sion of the judicial process.
The question must always be whether the sentence imposed is via-
ble; in other words, whether it is possible for a human being to serve that
precise sentence.
I am convinced a sentence that on its face is impossible for a human
being to serve is per se cruel or unusual punishment under Article I,
section 17, of the California Constitution, and perhaps also under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
9. Victoria Slind-Flor, Prosecutor Gets to See Other Side, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 8.
10. See Philip Hager, Molestation Defendants to be Freed, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1990, at
A3.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
12. Id. § 204 (West 1988).
13. Id. § 191.5(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
14. Id. § 273a(1) (West 1988).
15. Id. § 273d (West 1988).
16. Id. § 11413(a) (West 1988).
17. Id. § 273f (West 1988).
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Bear in mind that the Eighth Amendment requires a "cruel and
unusual" punishment to be prohibited,"8 whereas our California Consti-
tution requires only that it be "cruel or unusual." 19 This distinction was
emphasized in People v. Anderson.2' "Respondent [contends] ... that a
punishment is not unusual in the constitutional sense unless it is unusual
as to form, or method by which it is imposed. We cannot accept this
limitation of the meaning of 'unusual' .... ,,21 Can it be doubted that a
200-, 300- or 400-year term is at least unusual?
There is no question that sex offenses are serious and deserve severe
penalties, but not a penalty humanly impossible to serve. Such punish-
ments cannot be acceptable law. If they are, they confirm Mr. Bumble's
observation that "'[i]f the law supposes that,' . . . 'the law is a
ass. '.22
If a court were to impose as a condition of probation that a defend-
ant report to his probation officer once a week for 200 or more years,
courts would not hesitate to strike down that condition as impossible to
meet. How can they nevertheless approve a prison sentence of that
length?
The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dig-
nity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. '2 3 Thus, cruel and/or unusual amendments are aimed at
something more than curbing punishment designed to inflict great physi-
cal pain.
When we consider why [punishments involving torture] have
been condemned, . . . we realize that the pain involved is not
the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is
that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as
objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsis-
tent with the fundamental premise of the [Eighth Amendment]
that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed
of common human dignity.24
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (emphasis added).
20. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
21. Id at 653, 493 P.2d at 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
22. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TwIST 397 (G.F. Maine ed., 1954) (1838).
23. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
24. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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A sentence that is greater than a man's natural life is analogous to the
punishment of revocation of citizenship condemned in Trop v. Dulles."
As with that case, an extra-life sentence does not inflict additional physi-
cal pain but is a symbolic violation of the person's dignity, "the total
destruction of the individual's status in organized society."
'2 6
As Justice Marshall has declared, "one of the primary functions of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause is to prevent excessive or un-
necessary penalties."'27 "[A] penalty may be cruel and unusual because it
is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose.
'2 8
Here, an extra-life sentence can serve no rational legislative purpose,
either under the retributive or utilitarian theories of punishment.29 It is
gratuitously excessive punishment that demeans the government in-
flicting the punishment as well as the individual on whom the punish-
ment is inflicted. Such a punishment "makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment."30
Those who attempt to justify sentences of inordinate length remind
me of an old, undoubtedly apocryphal tale:
Judge: I sentence you to 200 years in state prison. After
that you will be a free man.
Defendant: But judge, I cannot possibly serve out that
sentence and win my freedom.
Judge: Just do the best you can.
What, then, is the answer if a defendant is convicted of numerous
counts, for example, five, ten or more forcible rapes? The maximum sen-
tence that should be imposed is one a defendant is able to serve: life
imprisonment. In a particularly egregious case involving exceptionally
numerous victims, the maximum conceivably could be life without possi-
bility of parole. Once courts declare century-plus sentences invalid, I am
confident the legislature will act to provide appropriate life sentences.
Such sentences would serve the purposes of punishment, would be consti-
tutional and would avoid making the judicial process appear oblivious to
life expectancy tables.
I mentioned the "cruel or unusual" clause of the California Consti-
tution, as distinguished from the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
25. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
26. Id. at 101.
27. Furman, 408 U.S. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).
28. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination
of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 846-53 (1972).
30. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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"cruel and unusual" conduct. This illustrates the necessity, in lawyers
arguing or judges deciding cases, of always weighing an issue against the
California Constitution. As the former distinguished justice of the Ore-
gon Supreme Court, Hans Linde, often declared: First, you examine the
statute, then the state constitution, and only as a last resort, the federal
constitution. That, he maintained, is the essence of true federalism.
With that concept I fully agree, and have written a number of law review
articles on the subject.
31
There are some recent developments that have made employment of
our state constitution in the interest of justice more important than ever
before. Consider, for example, the unprecedented holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante,32 that a forced confes-
sion does not require reversal per se. A five-Justice majority (Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter) held that the harmless error rule
applies to coerced confessions. The remarkable rationale of Chief Justice
Rehnquist was that the introduction of a coerced confession is simply "a
classic 'trial error'" that does not "'transcend[ ] the criminal
process.' "33
The harmless error doctrine apparently had its modern origin in
Chapman v. California.34 But that very Court cautioned that "there are
some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error. ' 35 The circumstances enumerated
were the rights to counsel,36 nonbiased judges37 and freedom from co-
erced confessions.3" Subsequent to Chapman, the Supreme Court added
three other serious errors not subject to the harmless error rule. These
were the exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the grand
jury,3 9 the right to represent oneself at trial' and the right to a public
trial.41
31. See, eg., Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Protecting Individual
Rights, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 651 (1988); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalisn: Both Liberal
and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1985).
32. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
33. Id. at 1264-65.
34. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
37. Id. (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
38. Id. (citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)).
39. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
40. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
41. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
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Refusal to tolerate coerced confessions had its origin in Anglo-
American jurisprudence nearly 400 years ago. Bram v. United States42
described a case decided in 1616, which quoted Lord Coke: "'The
human mind under the pressure of calamity, is easily seduced .... [The]
law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument of his
own conviction.' 4
Subsequently, prior to Fulminante, American cases decried consist-
ently the use of coerced confessions. Lyons v. Oklahoma I held: "A co-
erced confession is offensive to basic standards of justice. .
[D]eclarations procured by torture are not premises from which a civi-
lized forum will infer guilt."' 4 5  Said Rogers v. Richmond:"
"[C]onvictions following admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary ... cannot stand."'47 And the Court in Spano v. New
York 4 stated: "[I]n the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as
from the actual criminals themselves.
'49
Blackburn v. Alabama 5 o made it clear:
As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes
be convicted, there are considerations which transcend the
question of guilt or innocence. Thus, in cases involving invol-
untary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude
of our society that important human values are sacrificed where
an agency of the government, in the course of securing a con-
viction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.5
With a sweep of the pen, the fundamental right recognized by years
of unbroken precedent was swept aside by the bare majority in Fulmi-
nante, apparently out of misguided zeal to convict one they believed to be
guilty.
This kind of calculated damage to the principle of stare decisis is
disturbing. Retired Justice Lewis Powell recently wrote on the impor-
42. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
43. Id. at 547 (citation omitted).
44. 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
45. Id. at 605.
46. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
47. Id. at 540.
48. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
49. Id. at 320-21.
50. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
51. Id. at 206.
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tance of stare decisis. The doctrine is, he wrote, "essential to the rule of
law."
52
Justice Powell reduced the merits of stare decisis to three simple
specifics:
(i) The first is one of special interest to judges: it makes
our work easier .... It cannot be suggested seriously that every
case brought to the Court should require reexamination on the
merits of every relevant precedent.
(ii) Stare decisis also enhances stability in the law....
[Sitare decisis is necessary to have a predictable set of rules on
which citizens may rely in shaping their behavior.
(iii) Perhaps the most important and familiar argument
for stare decisis is one of public legitimacy.... An important
aspect of this is the respect that the Court shows for its own
previous opinions.5 3
Another egregious violation of stare decisis occurred when the
Supreme Court in June 1991, directly overruled its own decisions ren-
dered a mere two and four years earlier. I speak of Payne v. Tennessee,
5 4
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and a majority overruled Booth v.
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers.6
Booth and Gathers merely held that whether a defendant in a capital
case receives death or a lesser penalty should depend on the circum-
stances of the offense and a weighing of the aggravating and mitigating
factors in a defendant's life. The opinions of surviving family members
are irrelevant. Now under Payne, members of the victim's grieving fam-
ily may tearfully demand of the judge and jury that the culprit be put to
death to atone for their loss.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, undiplomatically characterized the new
decision as the result of a change in court personnel. He wrote, "Power,
not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking."'s He
expressed the fear that the Court now "sends a clear signal that scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration." 58
52. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, J. Sup. CT. HIST., at 17
(1991).
53. Id. at 15-16.
54. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
55. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
56. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
57. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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When the Supreme Court truck careens from one side of the consti-
tutional road to the other, state courts have one of two alternatives.
They can shift gears and change directions, thus achieving subservient
consistency with Washington. Or they can retain existing individual
rights by reliance on the independent nonfederal grounds found in the
several state constitutions. A growing number of states have adopted the
latter course. They have accepted Justice Brennan's cordial invitation in
Michigan v. Mosley; 9 he reminded us that each "[s]tate has power to
impose higher standards governing police practices under state law than
is required by the Federal Constitution."'
You may wonder how these "higher standards" apply in actual
practice. Do the states have a genuine rationale when they afford their
states' citizens more than the bare minimum of rights afforded under our
national charter? Let me offer brief examples of how state constitutions
have been employed to differ with federal constitutional interpretations.
If a person is stopped by a police officer for a simple traffic infrac-
tion, the motorist may be subjected to a full body search, to having all
parts of the vehicle searched and all containers opened and examined.
No constitutional violation, said the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Robinson 61 and Gustafson v. Florida.62 But many states
found that such police conduct offended state constitutional provisions
unless the officer has articulable reasons to suspect other illegal conduct.
A police officer or a public prosecutor may walk into a bank and,
with no authority of process, demand to examine the bank records of a
named individual or corporation. No constitutional violation, said the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller.63 But in a case
involving a lawyer, our court observed that one's canceled checks, loan
applications, et cetera, are a mini-biography, that one expects his bank
records to be used only for internal bank processes and, therefore, an
examination of them violates the state constitutional right of privacy, un-
less the records are obtained by a warrant or subpoena."
In Swain v. Alabama,65 the United States Supreme Court declared
there could be no restrictions whatsoever on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges of jurors. Our court agreed generally, but declared an exception
under state constitution principles: The challenges may not be used for a
59. 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
62. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
63. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
64. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
65. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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racially discriminatory purpose.66 Ultimately the Supreme Court re-
versed Swain and finally agreed with the position our court had taken
seven years earlier.67
As a final example, consider a commonly recurring factual situation.
A small orderly group of citizens undertakes to pass out leaflets, or to
solicit signatures on petitions, in a privately owned shopping center. The
shopping center owners seek to prohibit that activity. "Shut up and
shop" is their philosophy.
Obviously there is a built-in tension between two constitutional
guarantees. On the one hand the citizens assert their right of freedom of
speech, and the right to petition their government for a redress of griev-
ances. On the other hand, the shopping center owners assert their right
to possess and control private property and to exclude all nonbusiness
related activity. In that conflict which right is to prevail?
In 1970 the Supreme Court of California held in Diamond v.
Bland 61 that unless there is obstruction or undue interference with nor-
mal business operations, title of the property owners does not outweigh
the substantial interest of individuals and groups to engage in peaceful
and orderly free speech activities on the premises of shopping centers
that are open to the public.
On four occasions the shopping center owners sought certiorari and
rehearing from denial of certiorari, and in each instance they were rebuf-
fed by the High Court, with no votes noted to grant certiorari. We had
every reason to believe Diamond was the law.
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court took over an identical
case from Oregon, and in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 69 held that the owners
had the right to prohibit distribution of political handbills unrelated to
the operation of the shopping center.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins,70 and I must confess we sensed doom to our
theory of state constitutionalism. But, to our delight, the Supreme Court
agreed with us, nine-to-zero. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion that
declared the reasoning in Lloyd Corp. "does not ex proprio vigore limit
the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign
66. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
67. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
68. 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cerL denied, 402 U.S. 988
(1971).
69. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
70. 447 U.S. 74 (1988).
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right to adopt in its constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution."71
If you need a prime example of how state justices are sometimes
more understanding of the realities of life, consider the recent case out of
Texas involving Leonel Herrera, convicted of murder.72 After losing his
appeals below, he sought review in the United States Supreme Court.73
It takes four votes to grant a hearing, and he received four affirmative
votes.
However, his date of execution was approaching. It takes five votes
to grant a stay. None of the five Justices who voted against the hearing
would budge an inch to stay his execution. Thus the pragmatic fact ap-
peared to be that Herrera would get a hearing, but would be executed
before he could learn the result. A strange concept of justice by the high-
est court in the land.
Fortunately, there were two justices of the state court in Texas who
were understanding. Minutes before Herrera's execution they granted
the stay which had been denied by Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas.74 Once again, a state judiciary pointed the way to
justice.
Again the United States Supreme Court, in that very case, ulti-
mately demonstrated its concept of justice. Post-conviction claims of in-
nocence cannot be the basis for a writ of habeas corpus, declared the
Court's majority.75 How perplexed must be the American people who
naively believe that determining innocence or guilt is the fundamental
purpose of judicial proceedings.
Along that same line is the case of United States v. Williams.76 In
that five-to-four decision, the majority held a prosecutor is under no obli-
gation to inform a grand jury about substantial exculpatory evidence of
which he is aware.
For a brief moment let me inject a distantly related subject. Last
year our court rendered opinions in thirty-three death cases. Thirty-
three would seem like a substantial inventory, particularly because it was
almost one-third of our total annual output. However, while we were
rendering those thirty-three opinions, forty-six new death cases came in.
That same scenario occurred in 1988 with thirty-six new death cases,
71. Id. at 81.
72. Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
73. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
74. Ex parte Herrera, 828 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
75. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
76. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
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thirty-eight in 1989, thirty-six in 1990, et cetera. This reminds one of the
travail of Sisyphus pushing a boulder up the hill.7
Some day we may get a governor, a legislature and an electorate that
will take a truly dispassionate look at what the death penalty costs in
treasure and in its effect on society and the judicial process and will ob-
jectively determine whether it is worth it.
How pervasive have state constitutional law cases been in the vari-
ous states? The National Association of Attorneys General publishes a
monthly bulletin on cases decided strictly on the basis of state constitu-
tions, and found the distribution over the past four years to be the follow-
ing: California produced forty-nine such cases, New York and Florida
twenty-six each, Massachusetts twenty-five, Washington twenty-two,
Pennsylvania twenty-one, Oregon eighteen, North Carolina seventeen,
Utah fifteen, and other lesser amounts; Virginia was cited six times; only
South Dakota rated a total blank.
No doubt there is a growing interest in true federalism. There was a
time when states' rights were associated with Orval Faubus and George
Wallace barring the entrance of blacks to public schools. We are long
past that confrontational period.
The high court of Texas forthrightly declared that when interpreting
its state constitution, it would not be bound by Supreme Court decisions:
"[S]tate constitutions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, [but they] can and often do provide addi-
tional rights for their citizens. The federal constitution sets the floor for
individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. ' 78 A Texas
court of appeal added that "state courts can better respond to local inter-
ests .... Our society is at once homogeneous and heterogenous [sic] and
our legal culture should correspondingly be homogenous [sic] (national)
and heterogeneous (state). Moreover, the very concept of federalism em-
braces such an approach.
'79
I conclude with James Madison's words in The Federalist:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last
the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The
77. HORACE, EPODES XVII, at 154, 156 (E.C. Wickham, D.D., trans., 2d ed. 1930).
78. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986).
79. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
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powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the ob-
jects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State. 0
Sound policy 200 years ago. Sound policy today.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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